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Lay Down and Wait for Good News Unless You Are Bowling Alone:
A Comparison of the Identity Crisis Confronting the Japanese




"Always amused" by the references to the at-will employment
contract as a "feudal" concept,2 Gail Heriot argues that the erosion of the
at-will rule will bring about a "neo-feudalism" which will destroy the
separation between the private and public spheres by enabling the
employer to "invade" and dominate the worker's privacy 3 According to
Heriot, one can readily predict the effects that proposals to eliminate the
at-will contract will have on the American worker. One need only to
look at the Japanese lifetime employment "tradition," which according to
Heriot is "an extreme example of how feudal vassalage might look if
lifted out of the feudal context and put into the modem industrial
world."4
Heriot's argument is composed of two basic assumptions: first,
that the American worker currently "enjoys" a balance between public
and private spheres and second, that the at-will contract is responsible for
this balance.5 Doing away with the at-will rule, especially in conjunction
with other employment law reforms,6 Heriot argues, will not only impair
' J.D., University of Miami School of Law (2003).
2 Gail L. Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of
Contemporary Trends in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REv. 167, 167 (1993),
citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (for the proposition that the
at-will employment tradition is linked to feudalism.) Heriot notes Richard A.
Epstein's "same amusement" at this "error."
3 Heriot, id. at 175. Heriot "will leave it to the reader, however, to determine
whether this loss of privacy is a price that should be paid for employment law
reform."
4 Id. at 204.
5 Heriot's description of the at-will rule is synonymous with Epstein's, the gist
of which is that because the at-will rule is a "default" rule, the parties can "opt
out." Accordingly, the worker does not give up his private world unless he
chooses to do so. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. CHi. L. REv. 947 (1984).
6 Heriot, supra note 2, at 195. Three other employment law reforms are
worker's compensation, whistleblower protection, and mandatory parental leave.
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overall efficiency but will bring about several concrete effects which
bring about the "invasion" of the American worker's privacy interests.
7
While the public-versus-private dichotomy is not a legitimate
one, for the purpose of argument, it will be assumed that such a
dichotomy exists. Even for the salaried worker, the day is split into two
spheres: the "working" hours and the "non-working" or "off' time. The
working hours fall into the "public" sphere while the "nonworking"
hours fall within the "private" sphere.
When the public-versus-private distinction is viewed in this way,
the current identity crisis confronting white-collar professional workers
of these two societies is caused by a largely unregulated capitalist
market's valuation of the worker on the basis of his timesheets, rather
than by any erosion of the worker's "privacy" interest. In both systems,
the worker depends on his work to validate his identity and worth. And
the "others" who control the conditions of work, measure the worker's
value largely by the number of hours he is willing to sacrifice from his
"private" sphere.
Many workers find themselves trapped in this dilemma, even the
highly paid - albeit highly unsympathetic - associates of America's
white-shoe law firms, who purportedly possess the greatest degree of
bargaining power to "opt out" of the at-will contract. For such
employees, the fundamental contradiction has become so acute as to
cause, or threaten to cause, the "self' to become wholly extinguished by
the "other."
The overall purpose of this note is to examine the identity crisis
facing the elite white-collar professionals of two "hyper-industrialized"
work societies. This paper will compare the Japanese lifetime
employment system from the perspective of the core, male, management
worker allegedly afforded the protections of "lifetime employment" and
the American at-will employment contract from the perspective of
highly-paid associates in large corporate law firms. Despite the wildly
different historical and cultural underpinnings of the two employment
7 First, due to the increased costs of hiring, the employer will conduct a more
thorough investigation into the applicant/worker's background in order to gain
assurances about its inherently risky hiring decisions. Second, the employer will
attempt to influence and control the employees' private life in order to enhance
their productive capacity. And third, the employer will hire less people for the
same amount of work. Heriot, supra note 1, at 194-97. These effects signal a
"feudalization" of the employment relationship in which rigidity and longevity
are secured through a "highly ritualized... [and] pervasive bond driven more by
objective custom than by the individualized, subjective will of the parties." Id. at
215.
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models, there are similarities which account for the identity crisis faced
by both groups of workers, especially in today's volatile market
economy.
Part II describes the lifetime employment system from both a
cultural and historical perspective and examines the identity crisis of
Japanese "corporate warriors." Part III examines the identity crisis of
America's corporate law firm associates and Part IV responds to Heriot's
arguments.
H. The Japanese Lifetime Employment Model
For many like Heriot, it is difficult to imagine two employment
systems more different from each other than the American and the
Japanese. For one thing, the Japanese lifetime employment system is
nestled in a communitarian culture while the American at-will system
steadfastly maintains the liberal notions of the atomic individual and the
freedom of contract. For another, the prototypical Japanese corporate
warrior enters into a familial life-long relationship with his employer
whereas the American professional worker enjoys a great deal of
mobility. It is often noted that Japan is the land of the community while
America is the land of individual rights.9 It is no mystery then that labor
scholars and commentators compare the "bright" and the "dark" sides of
these two seemingly contradictory systems and marvel at the outcome-
that the same exact features that comprise the "bright side" of one
employment system directly accounts for the "dark side" of the other! °
It seems only logical to conclude that if the Japanese system
acknowledged and accounted for individual "rights," then the corporate
8 The identity crisis is best described by Duncan Kennedy's "fundamental
contradiction" in which the worker's "relation with others are both necessary to
and incompatible with [his] freedom." See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 213 (1979).
9 Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Communality: Looking Through the
Window of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 517, 518-520 (1993).
10 See generally id; Kyoko Kamio Knapp, Warriors Betrayed: How the
"Unwritten Law" Prevails In Japan, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 545 (1996);
and Heriot, supra note 2. Cf Makoto Ishida, Death And Suicide From
Overwork: The Japanese Workplace and Labour Law, Labor and Employment
in an Era of Globalization, (Joanne Conaghan, R. Michael Fischl, Karl Klare,
eds., 2002) and Kaiulani Eileen Sumi Kidani, The Japanese Warriors in Pursuit
of a Legal Remedy: The Story of Karoshi, or "Death From Overwork" in
Japan, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 169 (1999).
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warriors would not be keeling over from karoshi1 1 or hurling themselves
off of Mt. Fuji in order to escape their existential nightmares.
12
Conversely, if the American system acknowledged and cultivated a sense
of "community," then the American worker would not be experiencing
the erosion of families and local communities due to moral and social
decay and economic insecurity.
Nonetheless, however tidy and convenient in form, these
comparisons and conclusions do not paint an accurate picture of the
current conditions of the white-collar professional workers in either
society. Today, karoshi is catching on in the land of rights with the same
ferocity that job insecurity and familial/social decay is gripping the land
of community.
Although the analysis begins with a description of the unique
features of the Japanese lifetime employment system, a strict
"individualism vs. communitarianism" approach overlooks functional
similarities inherent in both systems that contribute to the identity crisis
plaguing the two groups of workers. Emphasizing "polar differences"
tends to undermine the fact that both employment systems are social
constructs, embodying deliberate political choices and historical
experiences. Instead of looking to each other for ideas on employment
and labor reform, both the American and Japanese labor systems could
perhaps benefit more by independently assessing how market-based
mechanisms that anchor both systems have failed to protect the workers
in their differing cultural and historical landscapes.
11 Karoshi (or death from overwork) is an extreme manifestation of the identity
crisis that workers face in both societies. Karoshi will be explored in great
detail in the following pages.
12 See Mark Magnier, "Japan's Suicide Epidemic in a Nation Where Mental
Illness is Shamed and Lifetime Jobs are a Memory, Some Desperate Workers
See No Way Out", L.A. TIMES December 14, 2001, at Al. Magnier's article
describes the large sign at the base of Mt. Fuji that states, "Wait a Minute! The
world holds bitterness but also joy. You only have one life to live, so think it
over." At least one taxi company in this area trains its drivers to spot the
suicidal worker arriving at Mt. Fuji. A dead giveaway is that the worker arrives
to this location by the latest train from Tokyo with little money. See also Heriot,
supra note 2, at 209 for further explanation of the term "existential nightmare."
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A. Japanese Uniqueness: The Corporate Person and
Kaishashugi Viewed through a Cultural Lens
13
The moral world of the Japanese communitarian society
relegates the self to the other. 4 Because the Japanese self is thus
"situated" rather than "unencumbered," group loyalty is the supreme
value.' 5 The unspoken rules connecting the fabric of the Japanese moral
world emphasize interdependence ("amae"), connection ("en"), harmony
("wa") and mutual responsibility for caring ("kikubari"). 16 Two sources
of the Japanese cultural view are the Buddhist teachings that embrace
submission to fate as the key to happiness 17 and the Confucian teachings
which emphasize filial piety, hierarchy, and reciprocal obligations!8 In
the Confucian tradition, duties, not rights, form the basis for human
action. Just as the subordinate owes a duty of obedience and loyalty, the
superior owes a duty of benevolence. In this cultural context, a
successful adult is aware of his position in the various hierarchical
relationships he is a part of and submits to the duties inherent in these
positions.' Two popular sayings, "lie down and await good news"20 and
"the nail that sticks out gets hammered down'2' capture these Buddhist
and Confucian moral norms which emphasis submission to fate,
conformity, and obedience.
The center of the Japanese moral world today for the male white-
collar professional worker is his company ("kaisa"). As the "public or
quasi-public space in his world which overwhelms other public spheres
13 Kaishashugi is a term coined by Japanese labor scholars combining kaisha
(company) and shugi (ism). This "companyism" is, according to a leading
analyst of the kaishashugi, "an exquisite combination of the capitalistic
competition with the communal or socialistic relations." See Inoue, supra note
8, at 530-3 1.
14 ld. at 528-39.
" Id. at 527.
16 Id. at 528; see also Knapp, supra note 10, at 569.
17 Knapp, supra note 10, at 581.
18 See generally Harry G. Hutchison, The Semiotics of Labor Law, Trade Unions
and Work in East Asia: International "Labor Standards" in the Mirror of
Culture?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1451 (2000) and Daniel H. Foot, Judicial
Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of -
Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 699-70 (1996).
19 A wagamana (childishly selfish person) is a worker who is too independent.
He is considered to be a social liability. Hutchison, id. at 1451-52.20 Knapp, supra note 10, at 576.
21 Robert Larsen, Ryousai Kenbo Revisited: The Future of Gender Equality in
Japan After the 1997 Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 24 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 189, 218 (2001).
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in importance," 22 the kaisa is the dominant source of the worker's self-
identity and loyalty. In exchange for unquestioning loyalty, the kaisa
furnishes the "corporate warrior" ("kigyo senshi") with social
recognition and legitimacy. Because the Japanese employment
relationship is not merely contractual but moral, it is said that in Japan's
corporation-dominated society ("kigyo-shakai"), the most widespread
religion is kigyo-kyo (corporate religion).23 The moral and spiritual
aspects of the worker's relationship with the company is exemplified by
messhi hoko, the practice of sacrificing one's life in service of the
common good to the point of self-annihilation.24 While the parallel
between the corporate warrior and the kamikaze fighter pilots of WWII
may seem extreme, it has long become common knowledge that
corporate warriors routinely sacrifice themselves literally the point of
annihilation by working themselves to death
25
Viewed through the Confucian lens, the corporation is a family.
The bosses are the parents (assuming the duties of benevolence) 26 and
the subordinate workers are the children (assuming the duties of loyalty).
In practical terms, the corporate warrior's "stamina, intestinal fortitude,
and dogged loyalty" 27 will be rewarded by life-long job security (until
the retirement age of 55 to 60) and automatic promotions based on years
of service.28 Under this system, the core employees of most big
corporations and many bureaucratic offices are recruited fresh out of
college or high school and furnished with extensive training and
22 Inoue, supra note 9, at 528.
23 K napp, supra note 10, at 569.
24 Inoue, supra note 9, at 528.
25 The results of a 1992 poll showed that nearly one out of every two Japanese
workers worried about karoshi. See Kidani, supra note 10, at 174.
26 For a discussion on the Japanese workers' perception that the company will
take care of them, see Mara Eleina Conway, Karoshi: Is It Sweeping America?,
15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 352 (1997).
27 Inoue, supra note 9, at 571.
28 The three "sacred regalia" of Japanese labor management relations are
lifetime employment ("shu-shin koyo"), promotion by seniority ("nenko
joretsu"), and in-company labor unions. Inoue, supra note 9, at 517. See also
Ronald J. Gilson and Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 508 (1999);
Fred Burmester, The Team Act - "Employee Participation Plans" Versus
"Company Unions": The Irony of Attempting to Reform American Labor Policy
Via a Japanese Labor Policy Which is Itself a Reformation (Corruption?) of the
American Labor Policy Imposed Upon Japan in the Final Settlement of World
War II, 23 J. CONTEMP. L. 307 (1997); Larsen, supra note 21.
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professional development which instills corporate loyalty. 29 Through a
highly ritualized initiation and training process, the corporate warrior-in
training assumes a respectable familial position in his company
30
Having entered the center of Japanese moral life, the corporate warrior's
position in his company becomes "a vital source of [his] self-respect, a
firm basis for his self-interpretation, and a prime determinant of the
social recognition he gains.' 3 l
B. Political Creation of Lifetime Employment as an
Anti-Union Strategy: The Other Face of Kaishashugi
Viewed Through the Historical Lens
However well the Japanese lifetime employment system may
seem to fit the contours of the Japanese communitarian society at large, it
is a practice32 - rather than a "tradition" - that resulted from an anti-
union strategy developed and executed by the United States.33 Rather
than a Confucian cultural construct, the Japanese lifetime employment
system is a political construct, tortuously created during the post-World
War II years and then thrust upon the Japanese society by appealing to its
traditional communitarian values, and arguably by pitting the elite core
workers against the non-core workers.
Many ironies inherent in the "individualism vs. communitarian"
analyses that emphasizes polar differences in the two systems surface
when lifetime employment is viewed through a historical lens. At the
turn of the century, American and Japanese labor systems practically
mirrored each other. Prior to World War II, the Japanese labor model
was a feudal 34 version of the at-will model under which - depending
29 There remains a rigid division between the core employees who have
"lifetime employment" and the non-core employees who are employed at-will.
The core employees are male, educated, white-collar professionals. The non-
core are female, blue-collar, service, and "non-essential" workers.
30 The recruitment process will be described in some detail in Part III.
31 Inoue, supra note 9, at 527-28.
32 Lifetime employment is neither law nor a part of any collective bargaining
agreement. It is simply a practice that large Japanese companies have more or
less adhered to for the core permanent management employees. Moreover, as
has been discussed earlier, the benefits of lifetime employment are only afforded
to the core employees - male white-collar professionals.
33 See generally Gilson and Roe, supra note 28; see also Burmester, supra note
28, at 314.
34 Unlike Gail Heriot's feudalism analysis, which is limited to the relationship
between the lords and the vassals, "feudal" as used here brings the workers - the
serfs who were wholly dependent on the lords for survival - into the equation.
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upon the economic circumstances - the industrial ruling class resorted to
mass firings (despite the absence of a public welfare system), or worker
poaching in order to curb worker mobility. The Japanese lifetime
employment system came about in part because the U.S. wanted to
impose something similar to the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
on the Japanese as a part of the post-World War II democratization
efforts. Finally, the lifetime employment model reflects the culmination
of the American anti-communist strategy. Viewed through a historical
lens, it is sublimely ironic that American policy-makers may have
contributed more to the creation of the lifetime employment system than
Confucius and Buddha could have ever have hoped to.
Prior to World War II, Japan was a feudal industrialized state
ruled by the zaibatsu, the industrial ruling class.35 Beginning with the
Meiji Restoration of 1868, this pre-World War II industrialization period
was characterized by exceedingly high worker turnover rates. During
World War I, for instance, the yearly turnover rate of 75% was the norm
in most Japanese industries.3 6 During the 1920's, a severe economic
recession caused labor instability and a corresponding labor surplus. 7
During World War II, however, the Japanese faced an acute labor
shortage and labor instability resulted from heightened employee
mobility due to a healthy external labor market
38
After World War II, the Japanese economy was in ruins. The
zaibatsu was restored to power and the companies reverted to mass
firings, causing a survival crisis among millions of Japanese workers. In
a society which lacked a public welfare system, the "threat of
unemployment was literally a threat to survival., 39 During this bleak
period people starved and companies dismissed workers at will. In
response to this crisis, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
("SCAP"), General Douglas MacArthur, initiated a "democratization"
program in order to counterbalance the zaibatsu restoration to power.40
At the heart of MacArthur's democratization efforts was the creation of
an independent labor union movement. By 1945, MacArthur's Trade
Union Law (heavily modeled on the NLRA) passed, granting the
Japanese workers the ability to form unions and to strike. 1 The Japanese
35 See Burmester, supra note 28, at 335.
36 See Gilson and Roe, supra note 28, at 519.
37 see id.
3s Id.38 id.
39 Gilson and Roe, supra note 28, at 520.
40 See Burmester, supra note 28, at 337.
41 See id. at 338. The Japanese Constitution (1946) also is reflective of General
MacArthur's early contribution to the development of Japanese labor law.
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masses responded by joining the newly formed unions in huge
numbers,42 striking against their employers, and taking over the plants
and running them without the managers.
The independent labor union movement was intense, effective,
and short-lived. By 1947, SCAP decided that worker control over
production was a direct threat to the U.S.'s new anticommunist Cold War
strategy and abandoned its pro-union democratization policy of 1945 4
In 1949, the "Dodge Line" - an "austerity" program developed by Joseph
Dodge, a conservative Detroit banker - went into effect, enabling the
SCAP to lend its full support to the conservative business interests and
their anti-union strategy. By June 6, 1950, the Japanese government,
together with management and the U.S., engaged in the "Red Purge."
Over 10,000 union members suspected of being communists were fired
and banned from all union activities. 46 The new U.S. campaign to crush
its own creation - the independent labor union movement - hit full
throttle within five years of the passage of the Trade Union Law.
When North Korea invaded South Korea two weeks after the
beginning of the "Red Purge," the fate of the independent union
movement was sealed*1 7 Recognizing the strategic importance of Japan,
the U.S. decided that it was necessary to build up the Japanese economy
in order to defeat communism. Additionally, the U.S. military presence
in the area assured an immediate demand for Japanese products. In
practical terms, three anti-union devices were borne by the American
anticommunist strategy and the Korean conflict: first, the infusion of
Article 28, still valid today, provides that "[tihe right of workers to organize and
to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed." JAPAN CONST. art 28.
42 See Gilson and Roe, supra note 28, at 521. At the time the Trade Union Law
was passed, union membership numbered 381,000. By the end of 1946, union
membership was at 5 million.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See Burmester, supra note 28, at 341-43. The Dodge Line was designed to
"stabilize" the Japanese economy, and involved balancing the national budget,
curtailing government spending, and limiting U.S. aid to Japan. As a
consequence of this program, severe tensions broke out between labor and
management over labor costs because managers were unable to pay more than
the "pitiful" wages that they were already paying. When union strikes broke out
as a result of this tension, management eventually crushed the strikes and the
independent labor movement with the aid of the SCAP.
46 See id. at 341; see also Gilson and Roe, supra note 28, at 521-22, where they
estimate over 12,000 workers were "purged."
47 See Burmester, supra note 28, at 342.
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American funds in support of Japanese management interests;48 second,
the creation of the company union backed by an appeal to the Japanese
traditional values; and third, lifetime employment. Through lifetime,
employment, managers won back their plants from worker occupation
firm by firm and crushed worker union support
49
By the mid-1950s, the key features of lifetime employment were
in place.50 Core employees were offered permanent employment (the
non-core employees were still at-will) and the external labor market was
suppressed by the government and business interests. Government
passed anti-poaching legislation and management negotiated
"gentlemen's agreements" not to recruit laterally. 51
This extended historical account is intended not only to point out
the many ironies inherent in the Japanese lifetime employment system,
but also to illustrate how a new socio-economic hierarchical order was
constructed (or reconstructed) within a short time span by the "powers
that be." Traditional communitarian values were important tools that
enabled the zaibatsu, with full American backing, to create the moral
universe of the kashaishugi to safeguard its capitalist interests. The fate
of the independent labor union illustrates the strength of Japanese
capitalist ideology. Although it was at first viewed as central to the
"democratization" of Japan, the unions' enabling workers to control the
means of production eventually threatened capitalism. Thus the
kaishashugi arose out of the ashes of the doomed independent labor
movement.
C. The "Dark" Side: Karoshi
2
Toshitsugu Yagi, a 43-year-old middle manager who succumbed
to a heart attack from karoshi, wrote in his diaries:
Let's think about slavery, then and now. In the past,
slaves were loaded onto slave ships and carried off to the
48 See id.49 See generally Gilson and Roe, supra note 28.
'0 See id. at 526-28.
5' Gilson and Roe argue that the "deliberate" closing of the external labor
market, not lifetime employment, is responsible for the employer's investment
in worker training and lack of worker mobility. See Gilson & Roe, supra note
28, at 527-32. For a discussion on the unwritten gentlemen's agreements, see
also Foot, supra note 18, at 699-70.
52 This comment does not address the symbolic aspects of karoshi. For an
excellent discussion of this topic as well as Emile Durkheim's studies of
suicides, See generally Inoue, supra note 9; Ishida, supra note 10.
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new world. But in some way, aren't our daily commuter
trains packed to overflowing even more inhumane?
And, can't it be said that today's armies of corporate
workers are in fact slaves in almost every sense of the
word? . . . . . Their worth is measured in working
hours. 3
Yagi concluded that the corporate warriors' lives are even more
miserable than the slaves of the past because the slaves were not denied
the simplest of life's pleasures, such as the right to sit down to dinner
with their families. 54  Those who bristle at the comparison of the
Japanese corporate warriors to the slaves of the past may find the
description of karoshi as "ritualistic suicide" a little less uncomfortable
55
Whether this crisis is one of "slavery" or "ritualistic suicide," what is
inescapable is that the lives of the 10,000 workers that fall victim to
karoshi (death from overwork) or karojisatsu (suicide from overwork)
every year signal an existential nightmare.56
Today's medical consensus in Japan would soundly disagree
with the American clich6 that "hard work never killed anybody.'6
7
According to the National Institute of Public Health, five work patterns
do in fact kill: working extremely long hours or night hours, working
without reasonable breaks, high-pressure work, extremely hard physical
labor, and continuously stressful work5 8 With the possible exception of
hard physical labor, the other four work patterns apply, in varying
degrees, to corporate warriors.59 One shared characteristic of all karoshi
victims, whether young or old, white or blue collar, is that every single
victim worked in excess of 3,000 hours each year (3,000 hours is
53 Knapp, supra note 10, at 550.
54 See Inoue, supra note 9, at 533-34.
55 For the discussion of karoshi as "ritualistic suicide on behalf of one's
company," see Foot, supra note 18.
56 For the definitions of karoshi and karojisatsu, see generally Ishida, supra note
10. The 10,000 per year figure comes from Knapp, supra note 10 at 551.
10,000 deaths is comparable to the number of deaths resulting from motor
vehicle accidents each year in Japan. Kidani, supra note 10, at 175.
57 That the clichd is seriously outdated or just flat-out wrong is evidenced by the
fact that United Nations has formally adopted karoshi as part of its agenda. See
Knapp, supra note 10, at 552.58 See Kidani, supra note 10, at 172-73.
59 A recent survey found that corporate warriors accounted for 62.5% of all
karoshi victims. See Knapp, supra note, 10 at footnote 35.
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equivalent to working twelve hour days for 250 days of the year).60 By
comparison, the internationally subscribed maximum working hour limit
is set at 1,800 hours per year.61 Despite the widely known health risks of
overworking, it is estimated that one out of every six Japanese worker
still puts in 3,000 hours each year.
62
Japanese law has played a heavy hand in legitimizing karoshi
because it has failed to restrict the capital-driven managerial prerogatives
in the areas of overtime regulation and worker's compensation. Worker
overtime in Japan is governed by the Labor Standards Law ("LSL")
which prescribes that "[w]orking conditions shall be those which should
meet the needs of workers who live lives worthy of human lives" (article
1) and restricts working hours to a maximum of 40 hours per week
63(article 32). Two additional articles in this same statute, however, give
teeth to employer demands for worker overtime and prove that articles 1
and 32 are a pretext if not a flat-out sham. Article 36 provides that
employers may force employees to work overtime as long as the union
(or a majority of the workers if no union exists) has agreed to work
overtime. Since the Japanese unions are company unions, nearly all
Japanese companies have these so-called "three six agreements.'
Additionally, article 37 prescribes a 25% premium for overtime pay.
Because the costs of hiring additional employees would far surpass the
25% premium pay, overtime is the only choice for employers in the
unregulated market economy.65
60 See id. at 552-53. See also, Ishida supra note 10, at 224.
61 See Kidani, supra note 10, at 174.
62 See Ishida, supra note 10, at 223; Knapp, supra note 10, at 552-53.
According to Knapp, one out of five office workers in Tokyo are afraid to fall
victim to karoshi.
63 See Kidani, supra note 10, at 186.
64 See Ishida, supra note 10, at 226-27; see generally Inoue, supra note 9.
According to the Secretary of Japan Federation of Newspaper Worker's Unions,
"it is no exaggeration to say the unions act as if life can be exchanged for
money." Knapp, supra note 10, at 555.
65 See Kidani, supra note 10, at 186-87. It is estimated that unless overtime
premium were raised to 62.5%, companies would prefer overtime pay to the cost
of hiring new employees. This figure does not account for the fact that workers
do not declare a majority of their "service" overtime hours. The direct
connection between overtime and profitability is shown by the fact that unpaid
compensation for overtime accounted for 20% of the profits at the Fuji Bank and
more than 10% at the Sanwa Bank in 1990. A customary practice in the banking
industry is the "Seven-Eleven," where the bank employees put in 16-hour days
by working from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 381.
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The courts have also assumed an active role in validating
managerial prerogatives even in the most extreme cases of worker abuse
in these two areas. With regard to overtime, the Japanese Supreme
Court has held that a worker can be fired for refusing to work overtime
on just one occasion. In the 1991 Hitachi case, the Japanese Supreme
Court held that "an individual worker has no right to refuse an
employer's request for overtime if the time does not exceed the limit
agreed upon by the employer and the union."66 The Hitachi court upheld
the firing of a worker for refusing to work overtime on just one occasion
despite the fact that the Hitachi "three six agreement" mandated overtime
work for wildly broad and ambiguous reasons like "attain[ing]
production targets.
67
With regard to worker's compensation benefits, the courts have
held that karoshi victim's families can be denied worker's compensation
benefits even if the worker died after working almost 5,700 hours/year.
In 1990, Koichi Fujiwara's widow was denied worker's compensation
benefits. The appellate courts affirmed this decision despite the fact that
the forty-two year old truck driver 68 died after working 5,700 hours that
year.69 Although Fujiwara routinely put in more than 200 hours per
month in overtime, the worker's compensation office found that no
causal relationship existed between Fujiwara's death and his work
simply because none of the company's other drivers who put in the same
kinds of hours had suffered serious illness or death.70 The callousness
inherent in the rationale of this decision 71 is not only reflective of the
hostility that confronts workers' compensation claimants in Japan but it
also reflects the inescapable irony that no worker could attribute his
death to karoshi - regardless of the number of hours he worked - unless
others like him also died.
6 Knapp, supra note 10, at 554-55.671 d. at 555.
68 Although the scope of this article is limited to white collar professional
employees, the holding of the Fujiwara case presumably applies to white collar
workers as well. See id. at 560-61.
69 See id. at 560, n. 92. Knapp notes that Fujiwara was paid only $500 per
month. One day, he worked 22 hours and 15 minutes.70 See id. at 560-61.
71 The callousness is especially severe when one considers that the corporate
warriors are absentee fathers and absentee husbands. After devoting everything
to the kaisha, he has nothing left for his own family. One corporate warrior
submitted this poem to a contest hosted by a life insurance firm: "Spent the
weekend with/Perfect strangers, or were they/My wife and kids?" Knapp, supra
note 10, at 550.
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Some corporate warriors like Ichiro Oshima cannot wait for
karoshi to consume their lives. He committed suicide after working for
one full year with only /2 day of vacation." Frequently working until
6:30 a.m., Oshima told his boss, "I cannot function as a human being. I
wake up after only two hours of sleep. 73 Oshima was 24 years old when
he gave in to karojisatsu.
There are two signs that the Japanese government has at least
acknowledged the karoshi and karojisatsu crises. In December 2001, the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare adopted a new criterion for
establishing causation in worker's compensation claims. 74 If the worker
puts in more than 80 hours of overtime each month for six months
preceding his death, courts are required to provide worker's
compensation benefits to his family.75 Before the adoption of this new
criterion, the claimant had to prove that the worker was under an
excessively heavy burden prior to his death (attributable to "an unusual
circumstance" or "excessively onerous work"), and that this excessive
condition arose within one week prior to death.76 Also, in February
2002, the Ministry ordered employers to send workers for full medical
checks by company doctors if they worked more than 80 hours of
overtime per month.
77
Even if these new measures seem to be little more than
"gestures," any impact that they may have on curbing employer abuse
directed against corporate warriors is severely undermined by the erosion
of lifetime employment. As of December 2001, Japan's unemployment
rate was soaring at a record high of 5.4% (3.5 million unemployed
workers).78 Since worker layoffs and dismissals do not equate to reduced
work burdens on the remaining workforce, 79 and because the threat of
unemployment is very real, it is highly probable that workers will be too
afraid to complain about their miserable working conditions. The
employers' abandonment of the life-long commitment to their workers in
72 See Kidani, supra note 10, at 188.
73 Id.
7 4 See Kwan Weng Kin, Death From Overwork - Tokyo Government Acts, SING.
STRAITS TIMEs Feb. 18, 2002.
75 See id.
76 See Ishida, supra note 10, at 227. This criterion excludes coverage to most
cases of karoshi - which result from gradual development of fatigue over an
extended period of time. See Knapp, supra note 10, at 552.77 See Kin, supra note 74.
78 For the proposition that corporate warriors are now being laid off en masse,
see Magnier, supra note 12.79 See id.
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the throes of a volatile economic market has ensured that the karoshi
problem will continue.
D. The Identity Crisis and Explanations
Socio-cultural pressures cannot account for why Japanese
workers continue to expose themselves to death by karoshi, especially in
an era when lifetime employment is a fast-fading memory for the
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of corporate warriors standing on
unemployment lines. The Confucian cultural lens explained lifetime
employment through the notion of reciprocal duties. The corporate
warriors assume their privileged roles within the kaisha hierarchy and
furnish "stamina, intestinal fortitude, and dogged loyalty" in exchange
for a life-long commitment and benevolence. Today, however, despite
the fact that the company has failed to live up to its end of the bargain,
workers still engage messhi hoko. Capitalist economics and politics offer
a more cogent explanation.
History reveals that lifetime employment was a political
construct arising from a calculated anti-union strategy, which was then
thrust upon the Japanese worker through an appeal to his communitarian
values and the Confucian promise of reciprocity. The independent labor
union was crushed precisely because its central role in the
democratization efforts threatened the capitalist ideology. Even under
the auspices of lifetime employment, key players in the karoshi rat race
were the products of unrestrained capitalism rather than the duty-driven
Confucian norms. Just as the company unions were created by capitalist
clout, a closed external market was also a capitalist creation, glued
together by the "gentlemen's agreements" not to recruit laterally. And
all along the way, law played a decisive role, legitimizing each of these
creations and enabling management to secure its interests. Law was not
a mere "heirloom sword," as many scholars have suggested,80 but an
effective weapon wielded by the management.
Irrespective of economics and politics, if lifetime employment
was ever an adequate explanation for the employer's domination (and
annihilation) of the worker's private sphere, as some have suggested, it
can no longer explain the continuing employer appetite for messhi hoko.
The only difference today from one decade ago when Heriot wrote her
defense of the at-will contract is that the Japanese corporations have
abandoned the lifetime employment relationship and have once again
have reverted to mass dismissals. By all indications, the Japanese
go See generally Inoue, supra note 9; Knapp, supra note 10.
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lifetime employment "tradition" barely lasted the working lifespan of
just one generation of Japanese corporate warriors.
Many scholars of the karoshi crisis have embraced Emile
Durkheim's thesis that the "way people die sometimes discloses the
dilemma or contradictions inherent in their form of social life.' '
Professors Baba, Inoue, and Ishida accordingly describe karoshi as a
symbolic death that embodies the dilemma of a society experiencing "an
exquisite combination of capitalistic competition with communal or
socialistic relations."82 However well this captures the dilemma of the
karoshi victims, it is perhaps even more exaggerated among the living-
the newly unemployed corporate warriors. The majority of the
unemployed today are the former breadwinners in their forties and fifties
who sacrificed everything for the sake of the kaisha. And they did so
with the expectation that the kaisha, the benevolent "parents," would
repay their loyalty with life-long security and commitment. In a society
where the moral universe centers around the kaisha, the kaisha's betrayal
has emptied the corporate worker of his self-respect and his social
recognition. Without the kaisha, and without an income, these former
warriors have nothing on which to base their identity- they cannot fulfill
the moral duties inherent in their overlapping roles as fathers, husbands,
and workers. Today, thousands of former corporate warriors are joining
the ranks of the 10,000 karoshi victims each year. Suicides directly
attributable to unemployment and personal debt now number 8,500
annually.83 As long as companies continue to hand out pink slips, the
kaisha will continue to devour both the corporate warriors of today and
yesterday.
111. The American Corporate Law Firm Associate
It appears either exceedingly unfair or callously superficial to
compare the plight of the Japanese corporate warrior to the highly-paid
associates of the large and elite corporate law firms in America.
Although corporate law firm associates work a great deal more than
average American workers, they are well-compensated for their choice to
do so. Thus the corporate associate's plight is far less sympathetic than
the plight of the corporate warrior. However, the experiences of the
American corporate lawyer are nonetheless valid indicators of worker
alienation and commodification caused by market-based valuations of
worth, irrespective of the choices that may otherwise be available to the
81 Id.; see also Ishida, supra note 10.
82 Inoue, supra note 10, at 538.
83 See Magnier, supra note 12.
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corporate lawyer. Both the corporate warrior and the corporate law firm
associate are members of the elite in their respective societies, and both
groups of workers are confronting an acute identity crisis. A discussion
of the corporate lawyer's dilemma does not trivialize the corporate
warriors' existential nightmare. Instead, the assumption that worker
alienation in the two hyper-industrialized societies are caused by
diametrically opposing forces can only oversimplify and trivialize the
experiences of both groups of workers.
A. Heavenly and Earthly Riches or Eternal Damnation:
the Role of Work
Like Japan, work dominates the American cultural and moral
landscape. The historic roots of the "Protestant work ethic" trace back to
the Puritan colonists' Calvinist belief that material success was a sign of
God's blessings on the select few that were "saved" from eternal
damnation.?4  Thus, hard work, thrift, and business acumen were
"qualities to be cultivated by those who hoped to enter Heaven. ' B5 The
Puritanical zeal for work is exemplified by their "holy crusade against
[medieval] holidays, demanding that only one day a week be set aside for
rest.
' 86
In The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max
Weber described the moral and religious dimensions of American labor:
Labor is not merely an economic means: it is a spiritual
end. Covetousness, if a danger to the soul, is less
formidable menace than sloth. So far from there being
an inevitable conflict between money-making and piety,
they are natural allies, for the virtues incumbent on the
elect - diligence, thrift, sobriety, prudence - are the most
reliable passport to commercial prosperity. Thus, the
pursuit of riches, which once had been feared as the
enemy of religion, was now welcomed as its ally.
8 7
Given this historical and religious background, American
workers have just as much at stake in their jobs as Japanese corporate
warriors. Their jobs determine their wages and economic prosperity.
Economic prosperity in turn determines the workers' standing in the
84 See Conway, supra note 16, at 364.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 id. at 365.
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community and signals their allotted spot in heaven. Poverty and
unemployment, on the other hand, signal eternal damnation and moral
depravity. Viewed through this historical and religious lens, it is not
surprising that the "pursuit of riches" is the American obsession and that
poverty and unemployment are abhorred. Among those who most
possess the capacity to fulfill the desire for riches is the American
corporate lawyer.
B. The Marxist Critique and the American Corporate
Law Firm in the Age of the Gargantuan Billable
Hour and the Greedy Associate
It is difficult to imagine a class of workers who least fit the
category of the "exploited" worker than the highly-paid associates in
beautifully-furnished elite corporate law firms. By all measures they
ooze success. And yet, it is the associates (or former associates)
themselves that hurl Marxist epithets and embrace the "exploited"
categorization. 88 The almighty billable hour, they claim, has reduced
them to the "most wretched of all commodities:" 89 mechanized hourly
wage-slaves. One associate claims that the "large law firm is one of the
only institutions in contemporary America that fits Marx's theory of
exploitation with no fudging required.'90 Two other former associates
(and now law professors) shamelessly assert that this is so because to the
88 Along with the sources cited in this article, the numerous anonymous
messages posted on the message boards and chat rooms on the internet provide
ready support for this proposition. My favorite is at GreedyAssociates.com.
The proliferation of these websites not only evidences the associates' ability to
voice their dissatisfaction with their working conditions but also provides a
means of worker solidarity. Somewhat like "identity-based network
organizations," see Alan Hyde, A Closer Look at the Emerging Employment
Law of Silicon Valley's High-Velocity Labour Market, in LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, (Joanne Conaghan, R. Michael
Fischl, Karl Klare, eds., 2002), these message boards provide informal advice
and networking opportunities for associates to counter the "bowling alone
ghenomenon."
Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER (Robert C. Tucker ed., Samuel Moore & Edward
Aveling trans., 2d ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1978) at 70.
90 S. Elizabeth Wilborn and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Views from the Front: A
Dialog about the Corporate Law Firm, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1996),
citing David, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND.
L. REv. 717, 735 (1988).
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big law firms, associates are disposable like "Doritos."9' According to
these critics, the corporate law firm structure embodies the capitalist
ideal. The partners who own equity stake in the firm and have a client
base (capital source) are the bourgeoisie. Each partner's salary is
supported by the labor of two or three associates, the disposable at-will
members of the proletariat.92 Despite the illusions of attaining the "holy
grail" of the equity partnership, the law firm leverage structure ensures
the associates' disposability.
93
That associates' Marxist ramblings have an objective basis in
fact is supported by numerous studies revealing how miserable and
dangerously unhealthy associates really are? 4 One out of three suffers
from depression, drug abuse, or alcoholism. 95 It should be noted that
lawyers generally suffer from a major depressive disorder at a rate 3.6
times higher than non-lawyers with similar socio-economic profiles,
96
and suffer alcoholism and drug abuse at twice the rate of non-lawyer
adults.97 Not surprisingly, lawyers commit suicide more often than non-
91 See Wilbom & Krotoszynski, id., at 1303-04 (when associates leave the firm,
the attitude is, "don't worry, we'll make more").
92 Wilborn and Krotoszynski describe the law firm structure as a "ponzi
scheme." Id. at 1312. In support, they cite the Merriam Webster's Dictionary's
definition of ponzi scheme: "an investment scam where early investors are paid
off with funds put up by later investors. Later participants are therefore subject
to increasing risks."
9' This is because firms must "regularly shed themselves of large numbers of
senior associates who are too expensive to do document reviews and other grunt
work and, moreover, are often fully capable of doing the partner's job." Id. at
1334.
94 See Keith Cunningham, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the
Law Firm's Failure of the Family, 53 STAN. L. REv. 967, 969-70 (2001)
(lawyers have the highest job dissatisfaction among all professional groups; see
generally Michael P. Schutt, Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Decline of the
American Lawyer: Social Engineering, Religion, and the Search for
Professional Identity, 30 RUT. L. J. 143 (1998); Edward D. Re, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S. L. REv. 85
(1994); David A. Kessler, Professional Asphyxiation: Why the Legal Profession
is Gasping for Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL. ETHICS. 455 (1997).
95 See Patrick Schiltz, Those Unhappy, Unhealthy Lawyers, NOTRE DAME MAG.,
Autumn 1999, at http://www.nd.edu/-ndmag/legl2f99.htm; see also Schutt, id.,
at 150.
96 See Schiltz, id.
97 see id.
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lawyers. 98 These figures are especially significant in a society that
spends $200 billion dollars a year dealing with job-related stress 9
The primary reason for the intense dissatisfaction and stress
levels among American corporate lawyers is that, like the Japanese
corporate warriors, they work too much. It is common knowledge that
associates in large corporate law firms routinely bill a minimrn of 2,000
hours per year. l °° Many bill 2,500 hours or more. 10 1 As a general rule,
since only two-thirds of the time actually spent working translates into
billable hours, attorneys must work 3,000 hours per year in order to bill
2,000 and 3,750 hours in order to bill 2,500.'02 Any claim that the
associates' work schedules allow for a "balancing" of work and family or
other private interests must first meet this mathematical challenge.
Family or personal time, much like the associates themselves, are "ever
diminishing commodit[ies].' ' 3
Like the Japanese law, American law provides no protection
against overwork. The Fair Labor Standards Act exempts white-collar
workers entirely from overtime regulation. 0 4 Just as in Japan, the law
98 See id.
99 See Conway, supra note 16, at 367. This figure comes from the International
Labor Office, which has concluded that stress is "'one of the most serious health
issues of the twentieth century."'
1oo See Schiltz, supra note 95; see also Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An
Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of
Billable Hour Requirements," 69 UMKC L. REv. 239, 240, 246-48, (Winter,
2000)(citing Chief Justice William Rehnquist's condemnation of the billable
hour requirement as "treating the associate very much as a manufacturer would
treat a purchaser of one hundred tons of scrap metal").
101 See Schiltz, supra note 95.
102 See id.; see also James Regan, How About a Firm Where People Actually
Want to Work?: A "Professional" Law Firm for the Twenty-First Century, 59
FoRD. L. REV. 2693, 2705 (2001)(working 3,000 hours is equivalent to working
putting in 60 hours every week and taking two weeks of vacation every year).
103 Cunningham, supra note 94, at 978-980. A recent ABA survey shows that
the top two reasons that associates are dissatisfied with their jobs are: "not
much time for self "and "not much time for family." Cunningham also notes
that 63% of 1,500 CEOs and HR Directors of large corporations said that "none"
is the reasonable amount of time for a father to take off from work upon birth or
adoption of a child. Id. at 975.
104 Section 13 of the FLSA exempts workers "employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional capacity or in the capacity of outside
salesman." In 1990, only 67% of wage and salaried workers were covered
under FLSA's provisions regulating overtime. This is not surprising since the
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legitimizes the big firm culture's instigation and maintenance of the
billable hour rat race by refusing to regulate it." 5 The elite firms value
an associate's contribution to the firm primarily, if not solely, on the
basis of his billable hours. 0 6 Where hefty timesheets equal "success,
promotion, and prestige,"107 the firm culture's message to the associate is
that if he can out-bill his cohorts, he will reach the "pinnacle" of the
corporate law firm - the equity partnership and job security.'
The Protestant work ethic that values material success and
abhors poverty is exemplified in the "age of the gargantuan billable
hour"'1 9 and the greedy associate. 110 Despite evidence that overworked
associates suffer serious health problems as well as an evisceration of
their personal lives, the gargantuan billable hour translates into worker
success and profitability, and explains why associates are unwilling to
stop running in the rat race. According to the 1998 National Association
for Law Placement report, only 2.9% of associates worked part-time
schedules even though 94% of law firms allow associates to do so.
Associates do not work part time because they fear "reduced
compensation, decreased advancement opportunities, and diminished
workplace reputation.""'
goal of FLSA was not to reduce overtime but to create work. See Conway,
supra note 16, at 366.
"' Lawyers, like the Japanese corporate warriors, do not have ability to form
independent labor unions. They are not "employees" for the purposes of the
NLRA.
106 At least 100 law firms listed on the National Law Journal's top 250 List
provide a "merit" based or "discretionary" bonus as measured by the associate's
billable hour. See www.ilrg.com.
107 id.
108 See Cunningham, supra note 94, at 983, (quoting a managing partner as
saying that in order to reach the pinnacle of the law firm pyramid, a lawyer must
be "fully committed and fully involved" and that a part-time lawyer can be
neither of these things).
'09 Id. at 979. One insider notes that "if you're in a law firm and all the powerful
people are working 100 hours a week, then that's communicating something
back about what's valued." Id. at 981.
110 Regarding the term "greedy associate": empirical studies show that many law
students come from an elite socioeconomic background. According to Susan
Daicoff, this explains why law students are attracted by the money and prestige
associated with the legal profession. See Susan Daicoff, Articles Lawyer, Know
Thyself a Review of Empirical Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on
Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1353-54 (1997).
". Cunningham, supra note 94, at 980-81.
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The quasi-religious pursuit of riches also furnishes a partial
explanation for sky-high attrition rates. Generally, in large corporate law
firms, 44% of new associates leave within three years and 73% percent
within six years of employment. 1 2  The "associate attrition clock"
estimated that in 1999, an associate left the firm every 15 billable
minutes. 1 3 In 1999, only 18.5% of these associates left the firm for other
work."1
4
In the "high velocity labour market" 115 of the 1990's, the
economy was seemingly healthy, the external labor market was strong,
and the greedy American corporate associate was bowling alone" 6 and
scoring high."17 If there was ever any time to romanticize or glorify the
American at-will contract, the late 1990's were it.
C. The Marxist Critique & the American Corporate
Law Firm in the Age of the Gargantuan Billable
Hour and the Hungry Associate
The Protestant work ethic that values material success and
abhors poverty exemplifies the current "age of the gargantuan billable
hour" and the hungry associate. Just as the Japanese employers
abandoned lifetime employment and resorted to mass-layoffs of the
corporate warriors in the 1990s, the American law firms are currently
undergoing a firing frenzy. The New York Law Journal website's
column entitled "Layoffs & Other Economic Problems" features over
100 articles detailing associate dismissals. 118 Articles like "The Life of a
Laid-Off Associate," "Highest-Billing Associate Gets the Boot," "Valley
Firm Tells Associates: Take Pay Cut or Hit Highway," and "Firms
112 See Regan, supra note 102, at 2707; see also Cunningham, supra note 94, at
970-71. The large law firm turnover rate is 20%. Within eight years, less than
1/3rd of the original associate class remains at the law firm.
113 Michael D. Goldhaber, Waging a War of Attrition, NAT'L L. J., December 13,
1999, at http://www.law.com/cgi-in/gx.cgi.
114 See id.
115 For further explanation of the term "high velocity labour market," see
generally Hyde, supra note 88.
16 The "bowling alone" phenomena is described by Hyde, id, at 348.
117 Most large firns increased starting salaries to $125,000 during the salary
wars of the 1990's. Some New York and Silicon Valley firms even went as high
as $145,000. See Kevin Wack, The Tide Turns: Remember when Associates
Ruled? Well..., Bus. L. TODAY December 11,2001 at 41, 41-3, as well as
websites devoted to associate pay monitoring and associate salary surveys. See
www.ilrg.com; www.nylawer.com/pay/index.html.
118 As of March 8, 2002 available at http://www.nylawyer.com/pay/index.html.
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Muzzle Fired Associates," signal the full-fledged return of the "dark"
side of the employment at-will contract for corporate law firm
associates.119 Internet message boards now warn of the "cloak and
dagger approach to firing' 20 and law firm "backstabbing.
1 21
Downsizing does not mean less work for the remaining corporate
associates. Rather, it threatens their very selfworth and in some cases
their redemptive potential.122 Thus, exceedingly high numbers of at-will
dismissals ensure that the corporate law firm associates, just like their
Japanese counterparts, will continue to sacrifice their public and private




The rat race continues in the land of community and the land of
rights where work dominates the cultural, social, and quasi-religious
landscapes. For the corporate warrior, as long as his "stamina, intestinal
fortitude, and dogged loyalty" translates solely into the almighty working
hour, he will continue to sacrifice his "personal" self to annihilation. In
the land of community, Darwinistic market forces, encouraged by ready
pink slips, continue to gobble up the worker, the family, and the civic
community. The death of the Japanese lifetime employment system
119 1Id.
120 The "cloak-and-dagger" approach to firing is when the partners tell the soon-
to-be canned associates, "keep up the good work," two days before firing them.
One firm used this approach when firing 10% of its associates. To add insult to
injury, associates were pressured to sign forms stating that they were leaving
"voluntarily." Wack, supra note 116, at 41-43.
121 One anonymous posting dated March 2001 warned: "In today's market,
these firms give the term 'backstabbing' a new meaning. Word to the wise - if
you hear people talking about 'Survivor' a lot, watch your back. I repeat, watch
your back. You're next." Id.
122 Conway argues that the problem of karoshi, in America, is "getting worse as
companies struggle to save themselves on the bottom line by trying to produce
more with fewer workers." Conway, supra note 15, at 352. See also Sanford M.
Jacoby, Melting Into Air? Downsizing, Job Stability, and the Future of Work, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195 (2000)(arguing that the recent downsizing
disproportionately affects all educated professional and managerial employees).
123 Professor Duncan Kennedy has argued that some evils of the corporate law
firms could be successfully remedied if progressive attorneys in those firms
asserted themselves. See Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law
Firm from Within, HARV. L. SCH. BULL. Fall 1981, at 36, 36-39. However, in
today's market, associates may feel even less comfortable voicing dissenting
opinions.
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perhaps best symbolizes the market's appetite for karoshi. Once upon a
time, at least a few members of the privileged ranks of society toiled
under their belief that their value as workers and members of the kaisha
deserved reciprocal obligations. The corporate warriors of today,
disposable at will, no longer enjoy and suffer from that delusion.
The market's appetite has not overlooked the land of rights. The
almighty billable hour has transformed even the most elite of the white-
collar work force into self-described "Doritos," and the current economic
downturn has assured that these "rugged" individuals will readily submit
to its demands. In many ways, the plight of the corporate law firm
associates is far less sympathetic. The greedy associate of the 1990's
gleefully entered the rat race running full speed. No matter what the
outcome, it can be conceded that the corporate lawyer cannot claim that
he was ever deluded into thinking that he had a "right" to any job.
In the era of globalization and the "high velocity capital market,"
unrestrained market incentives will likely have steroidal effects on the rat
race. The ushering in of the uber-rat race will likely pit the elites of the
two leading hyper-industrialized economies against each other. Where
the finish line is is no one's guess, but so long as the promise of riches
and the threat of the pink slip litter the working landscape, the
contestants are unlikely to step off of the track.
Given this background, then, today's corporate warrior and
corporate law firm associate pose some interesting challenges to Heriot's
at-will and "privacy" arguments. Heriot's first argument was that due to
the increased costs of hiring, the employer will conduct a more thorough
investigation into the applicant's background under the lifetime
employment model. For support, she pointed to the hiring practices of
Japanese corporations. Even assuming that the lifetime employment
"tradition" continues today, the first premise of this argument is flawed
because it is still doubtful that the costs of hiring a corporate warrior ever
exceeded the $100,000 that the large corporate law firm still spends on
recruiting and training a newly graduated law student. 24 The second
premise is also questionable given that the big law firms use multi-tiered
screening processes and have state bar-backed investigations into the
applicants' backgrounds. In a typical large law firm, the forces that be
screen resumes, conduct multiple personal interviews and reference
checks, and try-out the candidate through a summer during which the
firm can gain further assurances of the candidate's fitness prior to
extending a "permanent" offer. Moreover, since the offers of
employment are contingent upon the ability to practice law, the state bar
124 See Cunningham, supra note 94, at 1003.
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associations ensure a thorough background check in areas like personal
finance 125 and mental health history.
Heriot's second argument is that without the at-will contract, the
employer will attempt to influence and control the employee's private
life in order to enhance his productive capacity. Heriot contends that the
Japanese "cradle-to-grave, morning, noon and night image of a company
town never had a great level of appeal here."'126 Even if the factual
description of the Japanese lifetime employment model is outdated (or
worse, inaccurate), Heriot's second argument still does have merit. It has
been explained that the very disposability of the corporate law firm
associates under the at-will model provides disincentives for partners to
familiarize themselves with the associates and learn about their lives
outside the firm. For the partners, "getting to know an associate is akin
to adopting a Thanksgiving turkey as a pet: it's just going to cause you
more guilt at the end.' 27
In this sense, Heriot's thesis that the at-will contract protects the
workers' "privacy" interests is readily supportable. The critical question
here is whether the protection of "privacy" interests should be held in
such high regard, especially given the context: the at-will protection only
serves to dissipate employer guilt when eating its kill. The associates'
perception that they are viewed as "Doritos" by the firm's partners
evidences the profitability of the billing mill. Despite the prevalence of
studies that show the costs of associate attrition,128 the law firm turnover
rate was exceedingly high in the late 1990's.
Heriot's final argument is that there will be less demand for
workers under a lifetime employment system. Presumably because it
costs more to hire employees, the employer simply will hire less people
for the same amount of work. Two clarifications need to be made in
responding to this argument given the extreme working hour demands
made on the American at-will employee. First, the central issue is not
whether the employer will hire less but whether the newly hired workers
will have any protection against at-will dismissals. Under the at-will
system, no worker has any protection against dismissals, for any reason,
period. Under the short-lived Japanese lifetime employment system, the
core management workers enjoyed protection against dismissals without
125 In Florida, bar applicants required to disclose every check that the applicant
"bounced" within so many years.
126 Heriot, supra note 2, at 213.
127 Wilbom and Krotoszynski, supra note 90, at 1303.
128 One study says that it costs 150% of the associates' salary to replace them.
See Cunningham, supra note 94, at 1004.
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cause while the non-core workers did not. And second, both the
American and the Japanese companies are currently downsizing. The
practical effect of worker layoffs for the remaining workers is to work
more - so that they may hope to save their jobs, their worth, and in
America, one may even say their "souls."
After speculating that the "neo-feudalism" of the Japanese
lifetime employment system was "no historical accident ... given the
fact that Japan's industrialization followed quickly on the heels of the
collapse of its quasi-feudal system,' ' 29 Heriot asks whether the Japanese
lifetime employment tradition is "all bad.'A30 Her answer, in its entirety
is:
Of course not. In many ways, it is the answer to the
existential nightmare. Modem man may be falling into
the immeasurable abyss, without firm footing as to law.
or morality, but at least (under the Japanese system of
lifetime employment) he has some company. He has his
employer and his colleagues. Much more so than his
American counterpart, the Japanese employee has the
security, both economic and personal, that comes from
devoting oneself to a community.
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129 Heriot, supra note 2, at 204.
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